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INTRODUCTION
Legal rules, somewhat like laws of science,2 await discovery by explorers
whose prescience enables them to understand something others observed but
could not comprehend. We honor the explorer's achievements; if the discovery
is important enough, we are likely to celebrate the discovery at periodic
intervals and to re-examine where legal analysis or scientific discovery has
taken us in the intervening years.
In the field of insurance law, Judge Robert Keeton is one of the grandest
explorers of them all. In 1970, he published a prescient two-part article in the
Harvard Law Review3 in which he identified "two broad principles [that]
account for such a high percentage of what might otherwise appear to be
deviant decisions that the remainder can be accepted as within the margin of
error one should expect in the administration of any set of guidelines."4 The
first of these principles was that "an insurer will be denied any unconscionable
advantage in an insurance transaction, and [the second was that] the reasonable
expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries will be honored."'s With
time, the second of the two principles became known as a "doctrine," and the
so-called "doctrine of reasonable expectations" (or "DRE") is nearing almost
three decades of evolution. During this period, insurance law scholars have
followed the ritual of assessing the state of the doctrine in roughly ten-year
intervals,6 and the calendar tells us it is time for another look.'
2. The metaphor is inspired by Roger Henderson, 5 CoNN. INS. L.J. 69 (1998) who likens
Professor Keeton to the discoverer of a comet. Id. at 70.
3. Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions 83 HARv.
L. REV. 961 (1970) (hereinafter "Keeton Part One"); Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights
at Variance with Policy Provisions: Part Two, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1281 (1970).
4. Keeton Part One, supra note 3 at 961.
5. Id.
6. See Robert E. Keeton, Reasonable Expectations in the Second Decade, 12 FORUM 275
(1976); Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law After
Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST. L. J. 823 (1990).
7. Some though not all, of other reassessments of reasonable expectations occurred near
the ten-year anniversary of the doctrine's recognition. Some of the works include: Kenneth
S. Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable
Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REv. 1151 (1981); Arnold P. Anderson, Life Insurance
Conditional Receipts and Judicial Intervention, 63 MARQ. L. REv. 593 (1980); Gary L.
Birnbaum, et al., Standardized Agreements and the Parol Evidence Rule: Defining and
Applying the Expectations Principle, 26 ARIZ. L. REv. 793 (1984); Mark S. Rahdert,
Reasonable Expectations Reconsidered, 18 CONN. L. REv. 323 (1986); Stephen W. Ware,
Comment, A Critique of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 56 U. CHr. L. REv. 1461
(1989); Karen K. Shinevar, Comment, A Reasonable Approach to the Doctrine of Reasonable
Expectations as Applied to Insurance Contracts, 13 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 603 (1980);
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This article examines the connections between the doctrine of reasonable
expectations and the law of contract. Judge Keeton urged in his 1970 article
that protecting the insured's reasonable expectations is a better justification for
results in many reported cases than the rationales offered by judges! Without
disagreeing with that point, it can be claimed, as this article does, that
insurance law's efforts to explain outcomes that contradict the plain language
of contractual text are appropriately viewed as a subset of a larger effort to
rationalize contract law with the challenges presented by the widespread use
of standardized forms in consumer transactions. When viewed from this
different perspective, Judge Keeton's 1970 article was important not only for
what it said about the contours of insurance law but also for what it suggested
about the stance insurance law should take in an ongoing-and still continuing
-battle for the soul of contract law.
Whether or not one embraces the doctrine of reasonable expectations, it is
undeniable that Judge Keeton's doctrine has relevance well beyond the
boundaries of insurance law. Indeed, reasonable expectations have long been
the salient feature of the law of promissory obligations, as illustrated by the
brief tour in the next section of some of contract law's familiar terrain.
I. REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS AND CONTRACT LAW
A fundamental purpose of contract law is protecting the expectations of
contracting parties. Because our society views utility-increasing exchanges
between consenting parties as something well worth promoting, contract law
encourages such relationships by giving parties a predictable basis for relying
upon and enforcing bargains. Expectations constitute, of course, the core of
these relationships; whenever two parties exchange promised performances, the
manifested commitments excite reciprocal expectations. If one side's
expectation is disappointed, contract law entitles the aggrieved party to respond
in a way that, at least in theory, restores that party to the position he or she
William Lashner, Note, A Common Law Alternative to the Doctrine of Reasonable
Expectations in the Construction of insurance Contracts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1175 (1982); see
generally ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 25D, at 141-47 (2d ed.
1996); ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 6.3, at 627-46 (student ed.
1988); JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS §§ 11.1-11.4, at 311-
58 (1994); BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE
DISPUTES § 1.03, at 17-38 (1997); EUGENE R. ANDERSON, ET AL., INSURANCE COVERAGE
LITIGATION, Vol. 1, at 66-76 (1997). For a detailed accounting of articles, essays, notes, and
comments published as of 1990, see Henderson, supra note 6, at 823-24 nn.6-8.
8. Keeton, Part One, supra note 3, at 972-73.
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expected to occupy as a result of full performance of both sides' contractual
commitments.
Yet the protection afforded by contract law to disappointed expectations
is not unlimited. Not all promises are or should be enforceable; accordingly,
much of contract law is concerned with establishing the boundary between
enforceable promises and promises that have no remedy if not performed or
otherwise discharged.9 Stated otherwise, much of contract law explains
whether it is reasonable or unreasonable for a promisee to expect the promisor
to perform his or her promise. Some of the more prominent features of contract
law where the reasonableness of expectations is the controlling concept are
discussed in the following subsections.
A. Remedies
Perhaps the most obvious role expectations play in the law of contract is
defining the remedy to which a party aggrieved by another's breach is entitled.
The formula taught in first-year contracts courses and applied in countless
decisions puts the aggrieved promisee in the position he or she would have
occupied if the promise had been performed. Compensating an aggrieved party
for disappointed expectation ordinarily produces a damage recovery that is
larger, and perhaps much larger, than what reimbursing the promisee's reliance
would require. Likewise, protecting the promisee by requiring the breaching
party to disgorge benefits received under a restitution analysis would almost
always produce a smaller recovery for the victim of a breach. ° By allowing
aggrieved promisees to recover the broadest of the measures, contract law
encourages wealth-producing transactions and provides a strong incentive for
productive reliance on the commitments of others. Indeed, in a complex credit-
oriented economy such as ours, protecting expectation is essential if investment
capital is to be channeled toward wealth-producing activities."
Expectation, relative to reliance and restitution, is the broadest measure of
recovery for breach of contract, but most of the remaining principles of
contract remedies have the effect of limiting, rather than expanding, the
obligation of the breaching party.' These principles stand, in effect, for a set
of rules that explain when an aggrieved party's expectations are unreasonable
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981).
10. See id. §347 (articulating the expectation theory).
11. See Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 240 U.S. 581, 591 (1916)
(providing that "[c]ommercial credits are, to a large extent, based upon the reasonable
expectation that pending contracts of acknowledged validity will be performed in due course").
12. See also E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 871-946 (2d ed. 1990) (hereinafter
FARNSWORTH TREATISE); E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70
COLUM. L. REv. 1145 (1970).
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and therefore undeserving of protection. For example, the rule of Hadley v.
Baxendale3 provides that the aggrieved party can recover only those
consequential damages which naturally arise from the breach and which were
foreseeable at the time of contracting. Under this rule, it is unreasonable to
expect to recover consequential damages that were unforeseeable at the time
of contracting. To state it otherwise, one cannot reasonably expect to recover
damages that the other party could not know to guard against; to allow a greater
recovery would risk placing a potentially crushing burden on the breaching
party, a risk which would deter beneficial entrepreneurial activity.
To take another example, it is well settled that one cannot recover damages
that could have been reasonably avoided. It is, to state the proposition
otherwise, unreasonable to expect to recover damages that one could easily
avoid with reasonable efforts. The same point can be made with respect to the
rules governing whether an aggrieved promisee's expectation recovery should
be measured by reference to the cost of finishing the uncompleted performance
or the net economic loss occasioned by the promisor's breach. One cannot
have a reasonable expectation of recovering the cost to finish an uncompleted
performance if the diminution in value from the shortfall in completion is less
than the cost of completion. But the answer changes if the promisee contracted
for a specific outcome-even an economically inefficient one--in
circumstances where the promisor knew or had reason to know of the
promisee's expectation; in such an instance, even an economically detrimental
expectation can be reasonable.
To summarize, the package of rules defining the breaching party's contract
liability essentially describes what the aggrieved party can reasonably expect
to recover on account of the promisor's breach.
B. Contract Formation and Validation
Contract law also invokes reasonable expectations when determining
whether a contract has been formed. Under classical bargain theory, contract
formation requires a manifestation of mutual assent and consideration. 4 To
manifest mutual assent to a bargain, each party must make a promise; the
beginning or rendering of a performance can be the equivalent of a promise if
the beginning or rendering is conduct manifesting assent or if it is what the
other party is seeking. 5 Moreover, "promise" is defined as "a manifestation
of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to
13. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).
14. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (1981).
15. Seeid., §§ 18, 19.
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justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment has been made."' 6
Thus, when reduced to its essential ingredients, contract formation involves at
least one promise and one promisee who has a reasonable expectation that the
promise will be performed.
A depression-era case provides a useful illustration. 7 In In re Home
Protection Building & Loan Ass 'n Appeal of Harris, appellant undertook to
perform accounting services for a building and loan association from 1933
through 1936. He billed the association periodically, and payment was made
by crediting the amount of each bill to a mortgage given by appellant to the
association. When the association was liquidated by the state Secretary of
Banking, the Secretary refused to compensate appellant, claiming that no
express contract of employment existed. In finding an "implied contract"
based on the conduct of the parties, the court explained that
[a] promise to pay the reasonable value of the service is
implied where one performs for another, with the other's
knowledge, a useful service of a character that is usually
charged for, and the latter expresses no dissent or avails
himself of the service. A promise to pay for services can,
however, only be implied when they are rendered in such
circumstances as authorized the party performing to entertain
a reasonable expectation of their payment by the party
benefited. '"
There is nothing controversial about the idea that contract formation
presupposes the parties' mutual and reasonable expectations of being bound
to each other. The cases tend to involve situations where a misunderstanding
arises between the parties as to what their manifestations mean,2" or where one
party does not intend legal consequences but either knows or has reason to
know that the other party expects a binding relationship in the circumstances.2'
16. Id., § 2.
17. The use of older cases throughout this article to illustrate these ideas is deliberate. It
is against the background of these cases that the early contracts scholars would have formed
their views about contracts jurisprudence. See infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
18. 17 A.2d 755 (Pa. Super. 1941).
19. Id. at 757 (emphasis added).
20. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 20 (1981) (accompanying comments
and illustrations).
21. This limitation fits under the umbrella of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 20;
the most common illustrations involve the joker being bound to his or her word in
circumstances where the other side had no knowledge or reason to know that the promisor was
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In either situation, the question is what the parties understand or have reason
to understand in the circumstances. Thus, the promisee who is aware the
promisor is bluffing cannot reasonably expect the promisor to perform; but
when the promisee is unaware of the "joke" and the promisor should
reasonably know of the promissee's lack of knowledge, the promisor will be
held to his or her word.
Even if the parties manifest mutual assent to be bound, a contract will not
be enforced absent consideration or the presence of a recognized substitute.
The consideration doctrine, although something of an historical accident,
works as a proxy for societal norms that separate enforceable (typically,
bargained-for exchanges) from non-enforceable agreements (e.g., promises to
make future gifts, promises given in exchange for a pre-existing duty, promises
to forbear asserting invalid claims). Although consideration is most often
understood as a rule that distinguishes the enforceable agreement from the
unenforceable one, it is appropriate to view it as furthering the unarticulated
purpose of promoting reasonable expectations. Under the prevailing societal
norms that the consideration doctrine promotes, one cannot reasonably expect
to enforce another's promise if nothing of value is traded. Thus, if A convinces
B to promise something of value in return for A's promise to forbear from
doing something A had no legal right to do or to perform an act that A was
already obligated to do, A should not reasonably expect to be able to enforce
B's valuable promise.
When the doctrine of consideration is invoked either by a party in
argument or by a court as the basis for a decision, the role that reasonable
expectations plays is not typically explained or articulated. Reasonable
expectations have played a more obvious role in the development of an
alternative kind of contract which is enforceable without consideration.' Under
the doctrine of promissory estoppel,23 a promise is enforceable in the absence
of a bargained-for exchange if the promisor should reasonably expect that the
promise will induce the promisee's reliance. What distinguishes a contract
enforceable by promissory estoppel from the garden-variety bilateral contract
joking, but the joker knew or had reason to know that the promisee would understand the words
to be language of commitment.
22. That the consideration substitute-detrimental reliance-is a theory grounded in
reasonable expectations shows, in and of itself, that the consideration doctrine has a direct, even
if unarticulated, relationship to reasonable expectations.
23. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981) ("A promise which the
promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee
or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can
be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited
as justice requires.").
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is that the former has no agreement, no bargained-for exchange, no
consideration, and only one promise instead of two. Yet, when a promise is
enforceable under promissory estoppel, reasonable expectations must exist on
both sides of the transaction, even if a promise exists on only one. The
promisee relies on the promise because the promisee reasonably expects the
promisor to fulfill the promise; the promisor is bound because he either
reasonably expects or should reasonably expect the promisee to rely on the
promise. Although the doctrine of promissory estoppel does not seem
particularly radical from the perspective of the end of the twentieth century,
historians may judge the emergence of the doctrine as the most significant
contract law development of the last one hundred years, and subsequent
generations may mark the advent of promissory estoppel as the beginning of
the end for the centuries-old doctrine of consideration.
Whatever course this evolution takes, it is already apparent that reasonable
expectations are at the core of promissory estoppel. Promissory estoppel
originated as a response to a perceived deficiency in the way contract law's
bargain theory treated promises for future gifts. Under the rule that a bare
promise to make a future gift was unenforceable for lack of consideration, the
recipient of the promise was in a particularly difficult spot. Because the
promise was not an offer seeking something in exchange, the promisee could
not give an acceptance that would make the promise binding or prevent its
revocation. In several early twentieth century cases involving charitable
subscriptions,24 the promise of a gift was deemed binding by virtue of the
reliance that the promised gift would foreseeably induce on the part of the
promisee. Yet judges were uncomfortable enforcing promises in the absence
of consideration, and it was therefore common for courts to find consideration
somewhere in the transaction, even if the basis for recognizing it was extremely
tenuous.25 Embedded in the holdings of these early cases was the promisee's
foreseeable reliance because of a reasonable expectation that the promisor's
promise would be performed. Chief Judge Cardozo recognized this in his
celebrated opinion in Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank
ofJamestown,26 where he stated, even as he found consideration for the donor's
promise in an implied promise by the college to set up a memorial fund:27
24. See FARNSWORTH TREATISE, supra note 13, at 93-94.
25. Id. at 94; see, e.g., I. & I. Holding Corp. v. Gainsburg, 12 N.E.2d 532 (N.Y. 1938);
Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank of Jamestown, 159 N.E. 173 (N.Y.
1927).
26. 159 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1927).
27. Id. at 176.
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There has grown up of recent days a doctrine that a substitute
for consideration or an exception to its ordinary requirements
can be found in what is styled "a promissory estoppel."...
Very likely, conceptions of public policy have shaped, more
or less subconsciously, the rulings thus made. Judges have
been affected by the thought that "defenses of that character"
are "breaches of faith toward the public and especially toward
those engaged in the same enterprise, and an unwarrantable
disappointment of the reasonable expectations of those
interested.""
In other words, the essential point of promissory estoppel was that the
reasonable expectations of the relying promisee deserved protection when the
promisor could foresee (i.e., reasonably expect) such reliance.
Whether a contract is formed by bargain or reliance, the reasonable
expectations of the parties are fundamental to the creation of a contractual
obligation. Indeed, it is apparent that the promissory estoppel doctrine
emerged in response to the bargain theory's inability to prevent the
disappointment of a promisee's reasonable expectations in some circumstances.
C. Modification ofAgreements
The issue of contract modification is, in some respects, simply one facet
of contract formation. To modify or rescind an existing contract, the parties
must have mutual assent to do so, or one party must reasonably rely on the
28. Id. at 175 (emphasis added). The reasonable expectations underpinning for
promissory estoppel was reiterated in other New York decisions. In Matter of First ME.
Church of Mount Vernon v. Estate of Howard, 233 N.Y.S. 451 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1929), aff'd, 250
N.Y.S. 906 (N.Y. App. Div. 1931), the court stated: "The Allegheny College case indicates the
growth of the judicial process wherein the law is made to conform to the justice of the case, and
wherein the law enforces the reasonable expectations arising out of conduct." Id. at 455
(emphasis added). See also Barnes v. Perine, i2 N.Y. 18, 24 (1854), wherein the court made
the same point:
The objection of want of consideration for promises [of charitable
subscriptions] has not always been regarded with favor; and judges,
considering defences of that character as breaches of faith towards the
public, and especially towards those engaged in the same enterprise, and
an unwarrantable disappointment of the reasonable expectations of those
interested, have been willing, nay apparently anxious, to discover a
consideration which would uphold the undertaking as a valid contract.
12 N.Y. at 24 (emphasis added).
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other's promise of a modification or rescission." Under bargain theory, the
consideration requirement must also be met. Much like contract formation,
situations arose where the requirements of a contract to modify were not met
but the values of promoting fairness and preventing unfair surprise called for
recognizing the validity of the attempted modification. Like the contract
formation rules, the law in the area of modification of agreements has also been
influenced by reasonable expectations.
This is particularly evident in those cases where the parties altered a
contract in response to unforeseen or unexpected conditions and the technical
requirements of the consideration doctrine were not met. William Lindeke
Land Co. v. Kalman, ° a 1934 Minnesota Supreme Court decision, is
illustrative. The lessee, like many tenants during the depression, was losing
money in its operation of several eating establishments and faced the need to
vacate its leased premises unless the lessor would agree to reduce the rent. The
lessor agreed to a reduction of rent, but later denied the validity of the
modification on the ground that no consideration was received for it. In
finding the modification to be enforceable, the court stretched the consideration
doctrine to prevent a finding of invalidity, holding that a good faith
modification of a contract in response to unforeseen, substantially different
circumstances was enforceable. In rejecting strict application of the
consideration doctrine in such circumstances, the court described consideration
"as a medieval doctrine" and referred to the no-settlement-without-
consideration rule as one "responsible for the greater part of the objectionable
applications of the doctrine of consideration, whereby the reasonable
expectations of business men have been disappointed."',
D. Contract Interpretation and Scope of Obligations
Reasonable expectations have long played a decisive role in contract
interpretation. The principles approved by the court in Terrell v. Alexandria
Auto Co. 2 are representative of judicial sentiment:
29. The promise of rescission is functionally the equivalent of a promise to release the
other party from his or her contract duties. This idea is also closely connected to the doctrines
of waiver and estoppel.
30. 252 N.W. 650 (Minn. 1934).
31. Id. at 613 (emphasis added) (quoting James Barr Ames, Two Theories of
Consideration, 12 HAjv. L. REV 515, 524-525). See also Watkins & Son v. Carrig, 21 A.2d
591 (N.Y. 1941) ("[c]hanges to meet changes in circumstances and conditions should be valid
if the law is to carry out its function and service by rules conformable with reasonable practices
and understandings in matters of business and commerce.").
32. 125 So. 757 (La. App. 1930).
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In interpreting a contract not specific in its wording, it is
necessary to take into consideration the custom of the place
and the usual and customary manner of fulfilling like
contracts in arriving at what was the reasonable expectation
of the parties to the contract at the time it was made.3
Implicit in the foregoing statement is the observation that a promisee is not
entitled to receive whatever performance he or she subjectively desires; what
the promisor reasonably expected must be given some account. Furthermore,
the Anglo-American system of contract law sorts out disputes over the scope
of contractual obligations by measuring rights and duties in predominantly
objective terms: the scope of an obligation is measured not by what the
speaker subjectively intends, but by what the speaker apparently manifests.
Thus, when A speaks to B, the words A uses are given the meaning that B
could reasonably understand the words to mean in the circumstances in which
they were uttered.' The rubric of plain meaning interpretation would seem to
undercut this framework, but the essence of plain meaning is that the person
to whom words are manifested should reasonably understand the words in
accordance with their plain meaning because attaching any other meaning to
them is unreasonable.35 Whatever significance one ultimately gives plain
meaning,36 the fact remains that the predominantly objective system of contract
law protects the reasonable expectations of contracting parties, even if there is
some disagreement in the cases over what rules should be applied to determine
what a promisee might reasonably expect in any particular set of
circumstances.37
These principles were recognized and applied by Judge Cardozo in Bird
v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance,38 the famous insurance causation case
decided in 1918. The question in Bird was whether a policy of fire insurance
covered damage to a vessel, which was located about 1,000 feet away from a
33. Id. at 758.
34. This rather simple statement disguises some rather subtle and complicated problems.
For more discussion in the context of insurance, see Robert H. Jerry, II, Consent, Contract, and
the Responsibilities ofInsurance Defense Counsel, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 153 (1997-1998).
35. Id. at 166.
36. The status of the so-called "plain meaning rule" is a subject of considerable dispute
in contract law. See generally FARNswoRTH TREATISE, supra note 12, at § 7.12 (providing
more detailed discussion on the contract law dispute regarding the "plain meaning rule").
37. See ARTHUR C. CORBIN, THE LAw OF CONTRACTS § 1, at 2 (1950) (one-volume edition)
("The law does not attempt the realization of every expectation that has been induced by a
promise; the expectation must be a reasonable one.... The expectation must be one that most
people would have; and the promise must be one that most people would perform.").
38. 120N.E. 86 (N.Y. 1918).
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fire which never reached the vessel, in circumstances where the loss resulted
from a concussion accompanying an explosion that resulted from the fire. The
case turned on whether the fire, a covered cause, was the "proximate cause" of
the loss, and the court held that it was not. In reaching that result, the court
framed the issue as one of contract and invoked reasonable expectation as the
"guide:"
Our guide is the reasonable expectation andpurpose of the
ordinary business man when making an ordinary business
contract. It is his intention, expressed or fairly to be inferred,
that counts. There are times when the law permits us to go far
back in tracing events to causes. The inquiry for us is how far
the parties to this contract intended us to go. The causes
within their contemplation are the only causes that concern
US.
39
Moreover, Cardozo viewed reasonable expectations as a two-way street;
each party was as entitled to assert them as the other. Thus, in an insurance
setting, Cardozo thought it as important to consider the reasonable expectations
of insurers as it was to examine the expectations held by insureds. In Smith v.
Northwestern Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,' where the insurer sought to deny
coverage on account of the insured's alleged breach of a warranty of
seaworthiness, Cardozo wrote:
The primary purpose of a voyage policy is insurance of the
risk during a voyage then in view. Whatever insurance
attaches at the home port is incidental and preliminary. There
can be little doubt that the reasonable expectations of the
insurer are frustrated if the vessel starts on her voyage without
suitable equipment."
39. Id. at 87 (emphasis added). Cardozo must have been fond of this passage, for he
quoted it in later cases. See World Exch. Bank v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 173 N.E. 902
(N.Y. 1930) (citing both Bird and Silverstein); Silverstein v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 171
N.E. 914 (N.Y. 1930). Cardozo also invoked "reasonable expectation" to help explain the
meaning of the tort doctrine of proximate cause. See Perry v. Rochester Lime Co., 113 N.E.
529 (N.Y. 1916).
40. 159 N.E. 87 (N.Y. 1927).
41. Id. at 93. In other contexts, courts have used reasonable expectations to delineate the
scope of contractual duties. For example, in Daggett & Graves v. Johnson, 49 Vt. 345 (1877),
the court explained that a buyer who agreed to pay for milk pans "if satisfied with the pans"
could not arbitrarily indicate his dissatisfaction and thereby refuse to pay for the pans. Instead,
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The parol evidence rule, which receives more attention below,' is a
substantive doctrine that can be determinative in cases where the scope of
contractual obligations is disputed. If the parties execute a writing and one
party claims that a prior or contemporaneous oral statement or writing is part
of their overall agreement, the parol evidence rule's machinery is triggered. If
the court concludes that the writing sought to be supplemented or contradicted
is an integration (either complete or partial), then the rule will be applied for
the purpose of determining whether the collateral statement or writing is part
of the parties' agreement. Those who have tried to justify the parol evidence
rule usually explain its purpose as protecting the integrity of a writing intended
by the parties to be a final, and perhaps complete, expression of their
agreement. To state this purpose in other words, a party who enters into a
complete integration should not reasonably expect to be able to contradict or
supplement the writing with evidence of prior or contemporaneous negotiations
or statements. Also, a party who enters into a partial integration should not
reasonably expect to be able to contradict the writing with such evidence,
although consistent supplementation is not outside the zone of reasonable
expectation. From the opposite perspective, a party who stands on the writing
and seeks the protection of the parol evidence rule will assert a reasonable
expectation that the writing should be treated as final and perhaps complete as
well.
To summarize, reasonable expectations set the coordinates for the process
of identifying the terms of a contract, determining the meaning of disputed or
ambiguous terms, and otherwise defining the scope of contractual duties.
E. Rights of Third-Party Beneficiaries
The reasonableness of a third party's expectations is important in
determining whether that party has rights as an intended beneficiary of a
contract. Although it is not essential that a beneficiary know of the contract
"[h]e must act honestly and in accordance with the reasonable expectation of the seller, as
implied from the contract, its subject-matter, and surrounding circumstances." Id. at 348-49.
See also Olympia Bottling Works v. Olympia Brewing Co., 107 P. 969 (Or. 1910) (approving
Daggett & Graves). In Dunham, Carrigan & Hayden Co. v. Thermoid Rubber Co., 258 P. 663
(Cal. App. 1927), the court explained that a seller under an output contract could not recover
damages from a buyer based on the buyer's failure to resell a large volume of tires; "The large
volume now claimed essential by [seller] appears from the evidence to have been so far beyond
all reasonable expectation at that time that it was never mentioned." Dunham, 258 P. at 665.
42. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
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made for his or her benefit to have a right to recover on it," whether a
beneficiary has third-party rights is affected by whether "the beneficiary would
be reasonable in relying on the promise as manifesting an intention to confer
a right on him." This factor was recognized in Trustees of the ME.
Protestant Church v. Adams,4" an 1870 Oregon case. The court explained that
[t]he rule ordinarily is, that a mere stranger to an executory
contract between third persons cannot avail himself of the
benefits of its provisions, although named therein as a
beneficiary; but where the contract is of such a nature and has
been so far acted upon as to change the condition in life of the
stranger, and to raise reasonable expectations in him,
grounded upon the contract, it constitutes an exception to the
general rule.'
Thus, whether a party not in privity with the contracting parties has a
reasonable expectation of receiving a benefit under the contract can affect
whether the party has rights as a third-party beneficiary.
F. Policing Doctrines
Protecting expectations is a fundamental objective of contract law, but
promoting fairness is no less important. Although the strength of judicial
concern for fairness has varied across generations, the status-based, centuries-
old capacity rules for infants, the infirm, and others provide ancient evidence
of judicial regulation of contractual exchanges for fairness. In the late
twentieth century, many doctrines serve a policing function, including the
doctrines of duress, fraud, concealment, misrepresentation, unconscionability,
mistake, impracticability, and supervening frustration. Professor Farnsworth's
scholarship labels these doctrines as "policing doctrines," that is, doctrines
pursuant to which courts "police" the fairness of contracts.47
43. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 302 cmt. c (1981) (referring to donee
beneficiary, neither contact nor communication between the beneficiary and the contracting
parties is essential). An obvious application of this rule in insurance involves life insurance
beneficiaries, who do not need notice that they have been made beneficiaries on the contract
between the policyholder and the insurer in order to have rights under the insurance contract.
44. Id. § 302 cmt. d.
45. 4 Or. 76 (1870).
46. Id. at 87 (emphasis added).
47. See generally FARNSWORTH TREATISE, supra note 12; E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH &
WILLIAM F. YOUNG, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (5th ed. 1995).
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To some extent, the twin purposes of protecting expectations and
promoting fairness conflate. When a court declares that an expectation
asserted by a promisee is outside the zone of reasonableness, the application
of the relevant contract law principle carries with it a corollary assertion: it
would be unfair to the promisor if the promisee's expectation was protected.
To illustrate the point, consequential damages outside the range of
foreseeability are not part of a reasonable expectation that contract law will
protect; yet implicit in that principle is a normative judgment that imposing
unforeseen, and perhaps crushing, consequential damages on a breaching party
would be unfair.
The policing doctrines, as applied by courts, regulate the allocation of risks
in contractual exchanges and protect parties from conduct or substantive
outcomes offensive to a sense of justice grounded in judicially-recognized
collective norms. Because standardization has put pressure on the classical
contract paradigm, the policing doctrines embraced by contract law have been
put to frequent use when consumers have contested the implications of text in
standardized forms, including insurance policies. This particular context is, of
course, where Judge Keeton offered his insights.
H1. JUDGE KEETON'S DOCTRINE OF REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS
In the first part of his 1970 article, then-Professor Keeton identified "two
broad principles [that] account for . . . a high percentage of what might
otherwise appear to be deviant decisions" in insurance jurisprudence." The
first involved judicial disallowance of unconscionable advantage: "An insurer
will not be permitted an unconscionable advantage in an insurance transaction
even though the policyholder or other person whose interests are affected has
manifested fully informed consent."49
In the fashion of contract law's substantive unconscionability doctrine,"
Keeton's first principle noted those cases in which the substantive unfairness
of insurance contracts was regulated and observed that the principle operated
without regard to the insured's expectations. In other words, a finding of
unconscionability would not depend on the insured's expectation; the insured's
expectation of something different from what the insurer promised was not a
predicate to the application of the unconscionability principle. Even if the
insured expected restrictive coverage by virtue of an accurate understanding of
48. Keeton, Part One, supra note 3, at 961.
49. Id. at 963.
50. See UCC § 2-302 (1978); Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445
(D.C. Cir. 1965).
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clear language negating coverage, the plain language of the policy would not
be enforced if to do so would give the insurer an "unconscionable advantage."
In Keeton's assessment,
[t]his principle explains much that is called waiver or estoppel
in insurance law, in circumstances involving neither voluntary
relinquishment nor detrimental reliance - the essence of
waiver and estoppel respectively. It also accounts for most of
the distinctive controls over defenses based on warranty,
representation or concealment.... In addition, the principle
underlies the formulation of the precise terms of choice
imposed upon insurers in the most common applications of
the doctrine of election.... .
The second principle, which Keeton called "honoring reasonable
expectations," was articulated in the now-famous and oft-repeated formulation:
"The objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended
beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even
though painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those
expectations."5 In elaboration upon the principle, Keeton noted the historic
inequality in bargaining power between insurer and insured, the adhesive
nature of the contractual relationship, the absence of choice among
standardized forms, and inert statutory and regulatory oversight. Though
Keeton pointed out that "judicial regulation of contracts of adhesion...
remains appropriate," he concluded that embedded in the array of regulatory
doctrines was "a principle broader than the separate bodies of doctrine it has
sustained." 3
As a statement of principle, the doctrine of reasonable expectations
articulated by Keeton overlapped with many other rules. Indeed, he said as
much in the introduction to his article; he specifically observed that the
principle purported to synthesize what was occurring in many insurance law
cases.5 4 In particular, he acknowledged that the reasonable expectations
principle overlapped in significant ways with the unconscionability principle.
Because insureds do not expect insurers to seek unconscionable advantages,
any effort by the insurer to constrain or deny coverage in substantively unfair
ways is inconsistent with the insured's reasonable expectations. By the same
51. Keeton, Part One, supra note 3, at 963-64.
52. Id. at 967.
53. Id.
54. See id. at 961-62.
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token, the insured does not expect fine-print, or even some bold-print,
exclusions or definitions that significantly constrain coverage. Thus, in many
situations, pro-insured results could be obtained by resort to either the
unconscionability or the reasonable expectations principle.
What seemed new about reasonable expectations, as articulated by Keeton,
was its transcendence of contra proferentem. The widely recognized principle
that contracts, when ambiguous, are to be construed against the drafter
depended, by its own terms, on the existence of an ambiguity. The reasonable
expectations principle, as articulated by Keeton, had no such limitation; on the
contrary, the essential point was that the insured's reasonable expectations
could be enforced even in the face of unambiguous policy language. This
particular aspect of the Keeton formulation was important for at least two
reasons.
First, when the Keeton formulation stated that plain, unambiguous text
could be trumped by an insured's expectations, the formulation created an
alarming challenge to insurers' efforts to draft and achieve predictability. It
was not the case, of course, that insurers had never before confronted judicial
regulation through waiver, estoppel, election, and other principles, all of which
frequently did excuse the insured from the full consequences of unambiguous
text. Each situation, however, tended to turn on the facts of the specific case,
and while some statements of principle emerged from these cases (e.g., an
insurer that delays investigating a claim might be estopped to deny the claim's
validity), these principles would not operate to change the insurer's obligations
for an entire category of cases. In fact, these principles created a right in
variance with coverage only if the facts of the specific transaction seemed to
justify it. The Keeton formulation went beyond these other kinds of regulation
to which insurers had comfortably, if not willingly, adapted.
Keeton's formulation, unlike most other kinds of judicial regulation,
seemed to present a frontal challenge to insurers' ability to control how they
separated risks and priced policies. An insurance company's ability to
calculate premiums depends on its ability to measure risk with some precision,
even as it takes advantage of the laws of large numbers to facilitate distribution
of the losses associated with random events. The delineation of coverage in the
contract is intended, of course, to correlate closely with the risks the insurer is
willing to assume in exchange for the insured's payment of a premium. To the
extent the scope of the risk transferred in the insurance contract depends on the
scope of the insured's expectation, the insurer confronts a variable in its pricing
strategy that is difficult to measure, at least as unpredictable as jury verdicts or
judicial findings, and hard to control. From the insurance industry's
perspective, any insurer that succeeds in drafting clear, unambiguous text ought
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to enjoy the benefit of that text, notwithstanding a different understanding or
expectation held by the insured (assuming that the insurer or its agent did
nothing to promote that different understanding and that the text is not
unconscionable). The Keeton doctrine, however, challenged this assumption;
from the insurer's perspective, the doctrine put the insurer's reasonable
expectation at risk.
Second, implicit in the observation that the Keeton principle was stronger
than contra proferentem was the notion that something beyond contract law
was being invoked to create rights at variance with policy provisions. Keeton
described the principle as one that synthesized many "doctrinal theories,"
including waiver, estoppel, contra proferentem, reformation, rescission,
modification rules in contract, and agency." Because the policyholder's right
was not recognized by the text of the contract, the unstated implication was that
contract was not the source of the right. Treating the doctrine of reasonable
expectations as extracontractual also coincided with the argument that an
insurance policy, because of the "special relationship" at its core, is something
more than a contract and should be viewed as a product or some kind of chattel
or quasi-chattel.56
Ironically, at the same time Keeton's reasonable expectation principle
seemed new and dramatic, it also seemed to restate existing law. The cases
Keeton cited and discussed did contain what he described as "compelling
currents of principle,"" even as they applied a wide variety of doctrinal
theories. Yet the "compelling currents" he observed were also a shared
current, in that running through the cases was a single shared principle. This
singularity devolved from the fact that the courts in these cases were answering
one common question:
Under what circumstances can unambiguous language in an
insurance policy be disregarded in favor of an expectation of
the insured that is inconsistent with or contradicted by the
language of the policy?
55. See id. at 962.
56. See, e.g., Eugene R. Anderson & James J. Fournier, Why Courts Enforce Insurance
Policyholders' Objectively Reasonable Expectations of Insurance Coverage, 5 CONN. INS. L.J.
335 (1998); 1 EUGENE R. ANDERSON, ET AL, INSURANCE COVERAGE LITIGATION, 57-58 (1997);
8 JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE (1981); 7 SAMuEL
WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COiTACTS § 900, at 34 (Jaeger ed. 3d ed. 1963)
(stating that insurance might evolve into "a new and special form of chattel, or perhaps, quasi-
chattel").
57. Keeton, Part One, supra note 3, at 961.
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The common answer Keeton saw in the cases was what he articulated as his
second principle, which can be rephrased so that it answers the common
question directly:
Unambiguous language in an insurance policy is disregarded
when the policyholder has objectively reasonable expectations
inconsistent with the policy language.
With respect to the common question being asked and answered by courts
and by Judge Keeton, the contracts scholar would observe that the common
question sounds very much like a very ordinary parol evidence rule question
in contract law." An insurance policy is an integrated agreement; barring
extraordinary circumstances, it is almost certainly a completely integrated
agreement. The parol evidence rule does not forbid admitting evidence for the
purpose of determining meaning, but the absence of ambiguity means no basis
exists for invoking the rules of contract interpretation. The insured who has
adhered to the form now wants to contradict the integration with different
terms or to supplement the integration with additional consistent terms. These
different or additional terms are, of course, those that are alleged to reflect the
insured's reasonable expectations. If an ambiguity existed, there would be no
need to worry about the parol evidence rule because any evidence could be
58. Keeton mentioned the parol evidence rule as something an insurer might assert as a
defensive strategy when resisting a claim for a right at variance with policy language, but did
not discuss it. See id. at 962. An early writer who saw the connection was Professor George
Goble, who wrote in 1937:
A problem intensified by the wide use of standardized contracts is: To
what extent should oral understandings inconsistent with a written contract
be allowed to prevail? The parol evidence rule, which renders invalid oral
agreements prior to or contemporaneous with a written agreement, seems
entirely reasonable where the written document is the result of mutual
bargain. But where the terms of the document are dictated by business
practice or statute, the rule is not so just in application. This is because
such documents are seldom read, or if read seldom understood by the
public, and, therefore, there is a complete absence of assent to its
provisions. The result is that the courts have frequently come to the rescue
of the helpless or misled citizen, and have given effect to oral statements
made by him or to him in his behalf, at the time he accepted the document,
sometimes even in spite of an express provision that printed terms of the
contract could not be waived or modified. This is especially true in
contracts of insurance.
George W. Goble, Trends in the Theory of Contracts in the United States, 11 TuL L. REv. 412,
422-23 (1937).
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offered for the purpose of interpretation; by the same token, if an ambiguity
existed, there would be no need to invoke the doctrine of reasonable
expectations which refers to enforcing objectively reasonable expectations
despite unambiguous language to the contrary.
Even granting some disagreement among contracts scholars and courts
about how parol evidence rule issues should be resolved, contract law provides
an answer to the question posed. One formulation of contract law's answer is
set forth in section 211 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which
addresses the parol evidence rule question when standardized forms are
involved. Although this section was already in draft when Keeton's article was
published in 1970 and during the time he must have been ruminating about the
ideas that would become his famous article, it is interesting that the article does
not acknowledge or refer to the deliberations of the American Law Institute.
Section 211(1) states that the standardized form to which the consumer assents
is an integration with respect to the terms included in the writing, assuming (as
is likely to be the case) that the consumer has reason to believe that "like
writings are regularly used to embody terms of agreements of the same type."
Section 211(2) articulates a default premise: the writing is to be interpreted
as treating all adherents alike and "without regard to their knowledge or
understanding of the standard terms of the writing." As comment e to section
211 explains, "courts in construing and applying a standardized contract seek
to effectuate the reasonable expectations of the average member of the public
who accepts it." Thus, section 211(2) endorses an objective standard. Indeed,
the text of comment e bears a striking resemblance to Keeton's reasonable
expectation principle. This is probably not accidental; Keeton's article is cited
in the Reporter's Note to the comment. Section 211(3) completes the
framework by describing when terms are excluded from the contract: where
the drafter has "reason to believe" that the adhered party would not have
assented to the form "if he knew that the writing contained a particular term"
that term is excluded from the agreement. As Professor Henderson has
explained in more detail,59 section 211(3) treats the drafter's expectations as
controlling; a drafter who does not expect (i.e., have reason to believe) that the
adhered party would object does not lose the benefit of the term in question,
even if the adhered party claims that his or her expectations are being
disappointed. Under section 211(3), even the adhered party's reasonable
expectations do not matter if the drafter did not have "reason to believe" that
the adhered party would object.
59. See Henderson, supra note 6, at 848-53.
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There are many nuances in section 211, as Professor Henderson's
contribution to this symposium makes clear." If comment e is telling us that
section 211(2) is, in effect, the Keeton doctrine of reasonable expectations,
then sections 211(2) and 211(3) can be synthesized as follows: terms in the
writing are to be interpreted in a manner consistent with the objectively
reasonable expectations of the adhered party (see section 211(2)), except that
terms in the writing will be excluded (and therefore not interpreted at all) if the
drafter has reason to believe the adhered party would not manifest assent if he
or she knew the particular terms were included in the writing (see section
211(3)).
Section 211 is controversial, and the content of the rule is being revisited
and debated in the discussions of the proposed revisions of Articles 2, 2A, and
2B of the Uniform Commercial Code.6" But the important point for this
discussion is that section 211, a contract law rule, answers the right question
-- under what circumstances unambiguous language in an insurance policy is
trumped by an expectation of the insured that is inconsistent with or
contradicted by the policy's language. Moreover, the answer given in section
211 applies to much more than insurance policies; section 21 1's answer is
meant to be given whenever the same question is asked with respect to any
standardized form. Indeed, there is no obvious reason why the question ought
to have a different answer with respect to standardized insurance policies than
with respect to standardized forms used in any other industry where
standardized contracts with consumers are routine. If this point is granted, the
common question addressed by Keeton and by courts in the insurance cases he
discussed should be rephrased:
Under what circumstances can unambiguous language in a
standardized form be disregarded in favor of an expectation
of the adhering party that is inconsistent with or contradicted
by the language of the form?
This rephrased common question has challenged contracts scholars for
decades, and by 1970 it had received attention from some of the giants in that
field. Some of this history is discussed in the next section.
60. See id.
61. See id. See also Michael M. Greenfield, The Role ofAssent in Article 2 and Article 9,
75 WASH. U. L. Q. 289 (1997); James J. White, Form Contracts Under Revised Article 2, 75
WASH. U. L. Q. 315 (1997).
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11I. STANDARDIZED FORMS AND REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS
The reasons for the widespread use of standardized forms in consumer
transactions in the twentieth century do not need extended discussion here.
Suffice it to say that the advantages of standardization are considerable. Mass
production reduces per-unit costs, which benefits both parties to the
transaction. When products are standardized, the number of alternative
products is reduced, which tends to simplify the consumer's selection process
and make it easier for the consumer to compare alternatives based on the
features of the product offered. With respect to standardized contracts, the cost
advantages are much like those with standardized products, except that the
advantage of cost savings produced by the elimination of negotiation over
terms is counterbalanced by the potential for unfairness in circumstances where
the drafter of the form imposes terms that the consumer does not expect. Courts
have policed this unfairness in particular cases, and legislatures and
administrative agencies have promulgated rules to deal with the risks of
unfairness in particular kinds of contracts, including insurance policies.62
Arguably the most famous of the early explorations of the challenges
standardization poses to the principles of classical contract law was Friedreich
Kessler's famous 1943 article in the Columbia Law Review titled Contracts of
Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract.63 In the article's
opening paragraph, Kessler observed that contract law had evolved in recent
centuries to become "a tool of almost unlimited usefulness and pliability,"
giving order and rationality to the market system.' He explained:
Rational behavior within the context of our culture is only
possible if agreements will be respected. It requires that
reasonable expectations created by promises receive the
protection of the law or else we will suffer the fate of
Montesquieu's Troglodytes, who perished because they did
not fulfill their promises. This idea permeates our whole law
62. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcTs § 211 cmt. c ("The obvious danger of
overreaching has resulted in government regulation of insurance policies, bills of lading, retail
installment sales, small loans, and other particular kinds of contracts. Regulation sometimes
includes administrative review of standard terms, or even prescription of terms.").
63. Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629 (1943). This article was not cited or referenced in the
Keeton article.
64. Id. at 629.
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of contracts, the doctrines dealing with their formation,
performance, impossibility, and damages.6 5
In the next few pages, he discussed the increased reliance on standardized
forms by businesses, the advantages of standardization, and the efforts of
courts to protect the weaker party in such exchanges without appearing to
modify the rules of classical contract law.' To illustrate his point, Kessler used
insurance policies. 67 He referred to the "remarkable skill" of some courts "in
reaching 'just' decisions by construing ambiguous clauses against their author
even in cases where there was no ambiguity,"68 and how under the guise of
interpretation courts "change[d] warranties into misrepresentations."'69
Kessler then took up the issue of the consequences of an insurer's delay in
acting upon an application, noting that whatever skills courts had acquired in
clever interpretations of policy language was useless in dealing with a problem
of contract formation.7" Contract law, he reasoned, could not impose the duty
to act promptly on applications because insurers would simply include
language in applications negating any implied promise.7 He explained that
many courts, however, had found in tort law a duty to act promptly:
Thus the courts pay merely lip service to the dogma that the
common law of contracts governs insurance contracts. With
the help of the law of torts they nullify those parts of the law
of contracts which in the public interest are regarded as
inapplicable.... This approach enables them to disregard the
clause in the application by means of which the company
attempted to avoid liability prior to the delivery of the
policy.72
Kessler noted that this judicial approach, applied inconsistently in the cases,
was criticized for "undermining legal certainty and the stability of the
insurance business." That criticism was not unlike the alarm that greeted the
65. Id. (emphasis added).
66. See id. at 629-33.
67. See id. at 633-36.
68. Id. at 633.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 634.
71. See id. at 635 (quoting Carl W. Funk, The Duty of an Insurer to Act Promptly on
Applications, 75 U. PA. L. REv. 207, 214 (1927)).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 635-36.
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Keeton formulation of reasonable expectations in some circles. 4 After quoting
at length from a 1933 Connecticut case, 5 which identified the reasons that
imposing a duty on insurers to act promptly on applications would create
instability in the insurance business,76 Kessler put his finger on the fundamental
issue:
This line-up of arguments [in the Connecticut case] brings out
clearly the basic issue with which the courts in the insurance
cases are confronted. It is: can the unity of the law of
contracts be maintained in the face of the increasing use of
contracts of adhesion? The few courts which allow recovery
in contract and the many which allow recovery in tort feel
more or less clearly that insurance contracts are contracts of
adhesion, and try to protect the weaker contracting party
against the harshness of the common law and against what
they think are abuses of freedom of contract. The courts
denying recovery, on the other hand, cling to the belief that an
application for insurance is not different from any other offer,
and they are convinced that efforts to build up by trial and
error a dual system of contract law must inevitably undermine
the security function of all law, particularly since courts are ill
equipped to decide whether and to what extent an insurance
contract has compulsory features. 7
One page later, he identified the engine that drives the results in cases allowing
recovery for the policyholder:
The idea implicit in the cases which allow recovery seems
very fruitful indeed. In dealing with standardized contracts
courts have to determine what the weaker contracting party
could legitimately expect by way of services according to the
enterpriser's "calling," and to what extent the stronger party
disappointed reasonable expectations based on the typical life
situation.78
74. See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text.
75. Swentusky v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 165 A. 686 (Conn. 1933).
76. See Kessler, supra note 63, at 636.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 637 (emphasis added).
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In the next two sentences, Kessler anticipated and addressed the argument
that the rewriting of contract text in standardized forms is outside the judicial
role: he stated that "the judge-made law in the field of constructive conditions
is amply proving the opposite."79 Kessler did not explain this point in detail,
and it is one that may not be obvious to those who have forgotten some lessons
of contract law. By the beginning of the seventeenth century, English law
recognized that a bilateral contract with executory promises on both sides was
enforceable. Unless, however, the parties put language in the contract making
each party's performance expressly conditional on the other's performance, one
party could enforce the other's promise without showing that the party had
given or tendered to the other what was promised in the exchange. In the
famous eighteenth-century case of Kingston v. Preston,"0 Lord Mansfield
recognized the inherent dependency of promises exchanged in bilateral
contracts and reasoned that the court---not the contract's text, although parties
could still draft express conditions if they desired-decides whether the first
party's performance is conditional upon the other side's prior performance."
The law has since evolved to the point where the following default principle
is unquestioned: each party's promise in a bilateral contract is constructively
conditioned on the other side's promise, and a material breach of either side's
promise will give the other a right to suspend performance, even if the contract
does not expressly so provide. 2
The doctrine of constructive conditions is, of course, one that protects
reasonable expectations: in a wholly executory bilateral contract between A
and B, A reasonably expects that A will not have to. perform if B commits a
material breach, and vice versa. Whatever intentions the parties bring to a
particular contract, it is an objectively reasonable expectation across all
transactions that executory promises in a bilateral contract are dependent. This
doctrine rewrites text in the sense that it adds terms to the contract that are
simply not there; but no one seriously argues that courts, at least with respect
to the doctrine of constructive conditions, should abstain from rewriting text
to enable the reasonable expectations of the parties to be protected.
Kessler criticized courts that "prefer to convince themselves and the
community that legal certainty and 'sound principles' of contract law should
not be sacrificed to dictates of justice or social desirability." 3 Indeed, as the
79. Id.
80. 99 Eng. Rep. 437 (K.B. 1773).
81. For a more detailed discussion of Kingston, see FARNSWORTH TREATISE, supra note
12, at 637.
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237 (1981).
83. Kessler, supra note 63, at 637.
1998]
CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL
law of constructive conditions demonstrates, courts have long regulated text in
order to achieve justice. Kessler explained the point in this way:
[T]he rules of the common law are flexible enough to enable
courts to listen to their sense of justice and to the sense of
justice of the community. Just as freedom of contract gives
individual contracting parties all the needed leeway for
shaping the law of contract according to their needs, the
elasticity of the common law, with rule and counter-rule
constantly competing, makes it possible for courts to follow
the dictates of "social desirability.""
As important as Kessler's article was, he was not the first to appreciate the
connection between standardized forms and the potential for impairment of the
consumer's reasonable expectations. Professor Alan Schwartz has collected
and analyzed the contracts and sales articles written by Karl Llewellyn between
1925 and 1940,11 and Schwartz's research shows that Llewellyn had focused
on the link between reasonable expectations and standardization at least two
decades before Kessler. In a 1925 article published in the American Economic
Review, 6 Llewellyn recommended that courts read contracts to contain what
the weaker party would expect the contract to contain, and he used the example
of insurance contracts to make his point. Specifically, he advocated giving
"the insured . . . the protection he might decently believe he was buying,
without too close regard to the exceptions of the policy." 7 In so many words,
this was the Keeton formulation of the reasonable expectations doctrine: plain
language in the policy's exclusionary language should not be applied to
eliminate coverage if the insured had a "decent" (i.e., objectively reasonable)
understanding of the coverage his premium was purchasing." Llewellyn made
84. Id. at 638.
85. Alan Schwartz, Karl Llewellyn and the Origins of Contract Theory, in THE
JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW (Jody S. Krauss &
Stephen D. Walt, eds., forthcoming 1999) (manuscript at 48-59, on file with author).
86. Karl Llewellyn, The Effect of Legal Institutions Upon Economics, 15 AM. ECON. REv.
665 (1925). This piece was Llewellyn's first major publication; the article urged reform of
commercial law, suggesting that economics and the realities of modern business practices be
used guide these reforms. He explicitly credited Roscoe Pound (and some others) as the
originators of many of the ideas. See N.E.H. HULL, ROSCOE POUND AND KARL LLEWELLYN:
SEARCHING FOR AN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 139 (1997).
87. Llewellyn, supra note 86, at 673.
88. As Professor Schwartz observes, the proposed revisions to Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code adopt what Llewellyn was urging nearly 75 years earlier. Schwartz, supra
note 85 (manuscript at 54). Proposed UCC 2-206(b) states that "a term in a ... standard form
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the point again in a 1939 book review published in the Harvard Law Review,89
where he argued that "when bargaining is absent in fact," courts should "read
into" a form contract the terms "which a sane man might reasonably expect to
find on that paper.'"
The common ground in the writing of Llewellyn, Kessler, and Keeton is
striking. In his early sales scholarship, Llewellyn considered many of the
same issues with respect to standardized sales contracts that Keeton considered
with respect to insurance policies. Llewellyn urged in no uncertain terms that
plain text in standardized sales contracts should be given a meaning that a
reasonable consumer would expect in the circumstances. Kessler built upon
these same points in his Columbia Law Review article. Almost fifty years after
Llewellyn and approximately twenty-five years after Kessler, Keeton found
evidence that courts were reaching exactly that conclusion in the decided
insurance cases under a wide range of doctrinal theories. These common
insights and shared principles should not surprise us; after all, insurance
policies are but one kind of standardized form.
To the important work of Llewellyn and Kessler should be added the
insights of Spencer Kimball, another of the great scholars in insurance law. He
examined the shared currents of contract law and insurance law in a remarkable
study of insurance regulation in Wisconsin, which was published as a book in
1960.91 Kimball discussed in several passages the protection of the insured's
"reasonable expectations" as a regulatory objective. Kimball, utilizing the
insights of the early twentieth-century realists, tended to view insurance law in
contractarian terms.92 Building on the jurisprudence of Roscoe Pound,93
Kimball saw in the laissezfaire era of the late nineteenth century a formal view
. to which a consumer has manifested assent by a signature or other conduct is not part of the
contract if the consumer could not reasonably have expected it unless the consumer expressly
agrees to the term." The proposed revisions have been controversial, and, as Professor
Henderson discusses in more detail in his contribution to this symposium, the debate over
Article 2 is replicated with some variations in the discussion about the proposed revisions to
Articles 2A and 2B. Roger C. Henderson, The Formulation of the Doctrine of Reasonable
Expectations and the Influence of Forces Outside Insurance Law, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 69 (1998).
89. Karl Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARv. L. REv. 700 (1939) (reviewing 0.
PRAusNrrz, THE STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL
LAW).
90. Id. at 704.
91. SPENCER L. KIMBALL, INSURANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY: A STUDY IN THE LEGAL
IMPLEMENTATION OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PUBLIC POLICY, BASED ON WISCONSIN RECORDS,
1835-1959 (1960).
92. Id. at 210 ("Underlying the tough taught dogma of contract law, against which the
growth of insurance case law must be viewed .... ).
93. ROSCOE POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 82-84, 114 (1938).
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of contract law in which individuals contracted freely for the objects of their
wants. This public policy----contract freedom-meant that contracts "entered
into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by the
courts of justice." The elevation of contract text over other values was,
nevertheless, subject to judicial erosion by courts that "skillfully used the
canons of construction to relieve the insured of various stipulations, and
resorted often to the doctrine that ambiguity must be resolved against the
draftsman of the contract. '9 5 Interpretive techniques were accompanied by
judicial disregard of insureds' nonsatisfaction of conditions to coverage under
the reasoning that enforcement of the conditions would result in a forfeiture,
which are abhorred in equity." The freedom of contract tradition remained
predominant, however, until the twentieth century, and this simply encouraged
insurers to draft explicit forms that would exceed the reach of judicial efforts
to interpret them.9" This placed, he reasoned, two public policies in frequent
conflict:
There was, first, the pervasive policy of giving effect to the
reasonable expectations of contracting parties. Persons who
took out insurance expected to obtain protection, and it was
the concern of the law to assure them that protection. At the
same time, however, it was the policy of the law to preserve
the integrity of the [insurance] fund by preventing
unwarranted raids on it by persons not entitled to share.98
In this context, the securing of reasonable expectations to which Kimball
referred was the product of a judicial process through which the literal terms
of contractual relationships were adjusted to attain fairness between the
contracting parties.99
94. KIMBALL, supra note 91, at 210 (quoting Houlton v. Nichol, 67 N.W. 715 (Wis. 1896),
in turn quoting Printing, etc., Co. v. Sampson, L.R. 19 Eq. 462).




99. Essentially the same point was made in another passage in the 1960 text. In explaining
how courts regulate insurance, Kimball described one of insurance law's themes as determining
who, within a pool of insureds, is entitled to draw from the insurance fund. This required
balancing two competing public policies: "the preservation of the integrity of the insurance
fund against improper raids by persons not entitled to participate and the satisfaction of the
reasonable expectations of the insured." Id. at 7.
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Kimball, like Keeton, also appreciated how judicial manipulation of the
law of agency could produce results that protected the reasonable expectations
of insureds.10 In discussing the efforts of insurers to circumscribe the authority
of their agency force, Kimball noted that courts often found ways to
circumvent the limitations and to enable "an agent [to] modify an insurance
policy to conform to the needs of the insured."'' In analyzing an 1861
Wisconsin case where the court held that the contract modification was within
the scope of the agent's apparent authority, Kimball explained that "[t]hough
the result can be explained by an apparent authority doctrine, that is nothing
but a rationalization of the victory of reasonable expectations over the
principal's power to define the scope of the agency."'0 2 In other words, the
fairness inherent in protecting reasonable expectations trumped literal language
in the contract between insurer and agent purporting to narrow the insurer's
responsibility for acts of the agent.
To summarize, Llewellyn in the 1920s, Kessler in the 1940s, and Kimball
in the 1960s understood reasonable expectations as more than a strict
application of contra proferentem. Each of these scholars represented a school
of thought that envisioned contract law in functional terms, where the
objectively reasonable expectations of consumers or policyholders could trump
unambiguous text that, if read and understood, would defeat those
expectations. These scholars were not, however, writing in a vacuum. All of
them were familiar with the work of those who proceeded them, and all were
reacting in varying degrees to results in decided cases and judicial opinions in
those cases. These scholars would have been familiar with the rhetoric of
reasonable expectations in contract law and were undoubtedly intimately
familiar with the contemporaneous debates over promissory estoppel as an
alternative to consideration. They were also familiar with the important
contracts and insurance cases of their times. Llewellyn, of course, had the
smallest data set, but he would have been aware of Justice Cardozo's opinion
in Bird,'I3 where reasonable expectations were used to set the parameters for
causation under an insurance policy. Kessler had the benefit of Llewellyn's
thinking"° plus the cases grappling with the scope of the insurer's duty to act
100. For an early article exploring how the acts of agent could bind the insurer in ways
that contradict the language of the insurance policy, see Philo C. Calhoun, The Liberal
Construction ofInsurance Contracts, I CONN. B. J. 49 (Jan. 1927).
101. KIMBALL, supra note 91, at 224.
102. Id.
103. Bird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins., 120 N.E. 86 (N.Y. 1918).
104. Kessler cited the 1939 Llewellyn book review. Kessler, supra note 63, at 637 n.27.
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promptly on an application." 5 Kimball was no doubt well familiar with Gaunt
v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co.,"° where Judge Learned Hand
declined to enforce literally the language of a conditional binder for life
insurance under the reasoning that persons unacquainted with such receipts
(i.e., ordinary consumers) would not understand the form in accordance with
the narrow reading urged by the insurer."°7 Kimball would have also been
familiar with Lacks v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.," 8 where the court not only
found an airline travel insurance policy ambiguous despite clear text and
prominent signage near the vending machine from which the policy was
purchased but also paid homage to the fact that the decedent expected coverage
and would not have purchased the policy had she been informed at the time of
purchase that the policy provided no coverage for the trip on which she would
meet her death."9
No doubt these scholars also influenced the path of subsequent cases, even
if it is impossible to quantify this effect. Two important cases involving
reasonable expectations receive special treatment in the next section.
IV. REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS, INSURANCE, CONTRACT, AND
COURTS
Several important cases invoked the rhetoric of reasonable expectations in
the 1960s,"I but arguably the most notorious of these"' was the 1961 decision
105. See, e.g., Duffle v. Bankers Life Ass'n, 139 N.W. 1087 (Iowa 1913); Savage v.
Prudential Life Ins. Co., 121 So. 487 (Miss. 1929). These cases remain leading cases on the
issue, even in contemporary discussions. See, e.g., ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING
INSURANCE LAW § 32(a), at 178-82 (2d ed. 1996).
106. 160 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1947).
107. Id. at 601.
108. 118 N.E.2d 555 (N.Y. 1954).
109. Id. at 559.
110. See, e.g., Klos v. Mobil Oil Co., 259 A.2d 889 (N.J. 1969) (insurance solicited by
mail); Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1966) (duty to defend under liability
insurance).
111. Judge Keeton was the keynote speaker at a conference sponsored by the Insurance
Law Institute at the University of Connecticut Law School on October 17, 1997, in Hartford,
Connecticut. In a conversation with Judge Keeton at the conference, I mentioned to the Judge
that Professor Kimball's book had some passages which, though less fully developed than the
Judge's 1970 analysis, had some interesting parallels, and I asked if the Judge had discussed
reasonable expectations with Professor Kimball prior to publishing his article. Judge Keeton
said he had not, but that there had been a very important New Jersey case that had garnered his
attention and no doubt Professor Kimball's as well, and that this case probably accounted for
the similar, but independently formed views about reasonable expectations. Judge Keeton
could not remember the case's name at the time, but I believe he must have been thinking of
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of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Kievit v. Loyal Protection Life Insurance
Company.' In Kievit, the insured purchased an accident policy providing
coverage for loss "resulting directly and independently of all other causes from
accidental bodily injuries," and excluding loss "resulting from or contributed
to by any disease or ailment." The coverage-granting provision was common
at the time, but not all policies contained the exclusionary language. One
might speculate that the drafters thought the coverage-granting provision, even
with its lack of any further exclusion, was clear enough; by its plain language,
the policy covered loss due to accident, not loss caused by illness or disease.
But courts in a number of cases had to apply the language in multiple causation
situations, such as where the accident aggravated a dormant medical condition
which, in turn, led to the loss. Insurers lost many of these cases; courts held
that the coverage-granting provision articulated a requirement that the accident
be the "efficient" or "proximate" cause of the loss, and this led to a finding of
coverage in many situations even though a medical condition was operative to
some extent at the time of the loss. To counter this trend, some insurers added
exclusionary language, like that found in the policy at issue in Kievit, which
purported to eliminate coverage as long as a medical condition or illness even
"contributed" to the loss.
In Kievit, the insured's disability was caused in part by Parkinson's
disease, which developed at the same time the insured's accident occurred.
The court concluded that the insured's disability was covered, even though the
policy's language, applied literally, would have eliminated coverage. The
court explained:
When members of the public purchase policies of insurance
they are entitled to the broad measure of protection necessary
to fulfill their reasonable expectations. They should not be
subjected to technical encumbrances or to hidden pitfalls and
their policies should be construed liberally in their favor to the
end that coverage is afforded "to the full extent that any fair
interpretation will allow." Francis, J., in Danek v. Hommer,
28 N.J.Super. 68, 76, 100 A.2d 198, 202 (App.Div. 1953),
affirmed 15 N.J. 573, 105 A.2d 677 (1954). [Citations
omitted.] Where particular provisions, if read literally, would
largely nullify the insurance, they will be severely restricted
so as to enable fair fulfillment of the stated policy objective.
Kievit. Kievit was decided nine years before Judge Keeton's article, but one year after Professor
Kimball's book was published.
112. 170 A.2d 22 (N.J. 1961).
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See Richards [on Insurance], supra, p. 742, where the author
notes that the common clause to the effect that the death or
disability must result from accident "independently of all
other causes" would, if taken literally, be so unreasonable and
repugnant to the main purpose of the policy "that the courts
construe it very strictly against the insurers, and sometimes
really seem to disregard it altogether."'113
The first sentence of the passage sounded much like a robust reasonable
expectations principle. But because the rest of the passage referred alternately
to enforcing reasonable expectations, giving policy language fair
interpretations, and construing text strictly against insurers, it was far from
clear that this court's opinion stood apart from other cases where courts found
ambiguities where none existed. Moreover, the authorities cited in the passage
fell short of endorsing a reasonable expectations principle. The reference to
the Richards treatise, which stated that "sometimes" courts "really seem" to
disregard plain text when construing language "very strictly" against the
insurer, was hardly a ringing embrace of a reasonable expectations principle.
Danek did not involve a situation where the court disregarded policy language;
instead, the court in Danek utilized traditional interpretation principles to find
that the insurer owed the insured a defense under the policy.
Later in the opinion, the Kievit court drew upon an appellate court's
opinion in Mahon v. American Casualty Company, 4 which had been decided
only three months earlier. In Mahon, the court stated that the judicial role is
to interpret the policy's text in light of the "reasonable expectations" of the
insured in purchasing it."5 But in Mahon, there was no indication that text
would be disregarded; rather, the court in Mahon. seemed to be saying that the
policy's text would be interpreted to further reasonable expectations whenever
ambiguities are present.
Near the end of the Kievit opinion, another passage more directly
suggested that something beyond contra proferentem was being endorsed by
the court. The court explained that it attached
little significance to the presence of the exclusionary clause in
view of the primary provision limiting coverage to loss from
accidental bodily injuries, directly and independently of all
other causes.... the court's goal in construing an accident
113. Id. at 26-27.
114. 167 A.2d 191 (1961).
115. Id. at 196.
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insurance policy is to effectuate the reasonable expectations
of the average member of the public who buys it; he may
hardly be expected to draw any subtle or legalistic distinctions
based on the presence or absence of the exclusionary clause
for he pays premiums in the strong belief that if he sustains
accidental injury which results (in the commonly accepted
sense) in his disability he will be indemnified and not left
empty-handed on the company's assertion that his disability
was caused or contributed to by a latent disease or condition
of which he was unaware and which did not affect him before
the accident."6
By one reading, this passage simply reaffirmed the earlier discussion,
stating that the court must interpret the policy language in question to effect the
reasonable expectations of the policyholder. Yet the court in the later passage
did not claim that the exclusionary language was ambiguous, and the court
clearly stated that it attached "little significance to the presence" of the
exclusion given the expectations that would be created by the coverage-
granting section. If one emphasized this aspect of the passage, Kievit could be
read as embracing a reasonable expectations principle along the lines of what
Keeton would later articulate in his article.
However one reads Kievit, the case was at least an important milestone in
the evolution of the reasonable expectations principle. But this case, like Judge
Keeton's 1970 article, must be read in a broader context. Kievit followed by
only one year an even more prominent decision rendered by the New Jersey
Supreme Court. In Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,1 7 plaintiff Mr.
Henningsen purchased a new 1955 Plymouth automobile from an authorized
Plymouth dealer. The purchase order was a one-page standardized form with
text of varied sizes and fonts on the front and back. The seventh paragraph on
the back of the form, which contained sixty-five lines of type in ten separate
paragraphs, purported to exclude all warranties on behalf the dealer and
manufacturer, express or implied, except as set forth in the paragraph. Further,
this paragraph limited the manufacturer's warranty to repairing or replacing
any defective parts which failed within ninety days after purchase or until the
car had been driven 4,000 miles, whichever occurred first. Although the
paragraph did not mention personal injury, under the plain terms of the text the
manufacturer had no liability for anything else, including personal injury,
resulting from any defect in the vehicle. Ten days after the purchase, something
116. Kievet, 170 A.2d at 30.
117. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
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failed in the steering mechanism while Mrs. Henningsen was driving the
vehicle. This caused an accident, Mrs. Henningsen suffered physical injury,
and the plaintiffs sued the dealer and the manufacturer for damages on account
of her injuries. The defendants denied liability based upon, inter alia, the
disclaimer of liability on the back of the purchase order.
In a lengthy opinion, the court canvassed many issues and ultimately
affirmed the jury's verdict for the plaintiffs. At one point in the opinion, the
court considered whether, assuming there were grounds to charge Mr.
Henningsen with awareness of the text of the limitation of liability, it could "be
said that an ordinary layman would realize what he was relinquishing in return
for what he was being granted."' 18 The court concluded that
only the abandonment of all sense of justice would permit us
to hold that, as a matter of law, the phrase "its obligation
under this warranty being limited to making good at its
factory any part or parts thereof' signifies to an ordinary
reasonable person that he is relinquishing any personal injury
claim that might flow from the use of a defective
automobile." 9
In essence, the court reasoned that the limitation of liability was not
binding on the buyer because the buyer would not reasonably expect this
disclaimer to take away the claims for personal injury, notwithstanding the
literal terms of the text. Furthermore, the court implied that the defendants
knew or had reason to know that the recipient of the form would not reasonably
expect this disclaimer to take away the personal injury claims. The court
mentioned that the drafters and presenters of the form could have done more
to inform buyers of their intention to disclaim liability for injury claims. 120
Also, the court cited evidence that Chrysler was aware of the terms of the
warranty drafted by the Automobile Manufacturers Association, but that
Chrysler did "nothing . . . to stimulate the idea that the intention of the
warranty is to exclude personal injury claims."' 2' In short, under the court's
reasoning, it would not matter if the buyer were aware of the disclaimer
because the buyer would not expect the disclaimer to reach as far as the
defendants urged.
118. Id. at 92.
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But the court's opinion went even farther than that. Because the court also
held that the disclaimer was invalid on grounds of public policy," the result
would not change if the buyer had read and understood the limitation of
liability. The seller could not have obtained a safe harbor by bringing the
disclaimer to the buyer's attention and explaining it. In other words, this
standardized form was inconsistent with the objectively reasonable
expectations of a member of the buying public, and these expectations trumped
the clear, unambiguous language of the form that, if applied literally, would
negate those expectations. This was, in effect, the reasonable expectations
principle articulated by Judge Keeton, albeit in a contract for the sale of goods
made pursuant to a standardized form.
Thus, both Kievit and Henningsen stand as cases that favor the consumer's
reasonable expectations against unambiguous contract text that, if enforced
literally, would negate those expectations. That one case involves an insurance
policy and the other a limitation of liability in a contract for the sale of goods
does not seem to matter, for the cases have a shared current of principle." The
law of contract, apart from whatever insurance law might require, is flexible
and pliable enough to embrace the proposition that a consumer's reasonable
expectations has the potential to trump unambiguous text. This invites us to
view Judge Keeton's discovery in 1970 of a new principle or doctrine in a
broader context, as the next and final section explains.
CONCLUSION
Throughout most of the twentieth century, courts and scholars have battled
for the soul of contract law. On one side are the formalists or classicists, whose
champions are Professor Williston and the first Restatement of Contracts. The
formalists care mightily about texts and the four comers of documents. They
believe that words often have a plain meaning that exists independently of any
sense in which the speaker or writer may intend the words. They insist that a
court or a party can discern the meaning of contractual language without asking
about the intentions or expectations of the parties. They contend that
interpretation is appropriate only if an ambiguity appears on the face of the
document, which means that the parties by their own testimony about what
they intended or expected cannot create an ambiguity where none exists.
Because they feel strongly about the integrity of writings intended as final
expressions, they approve of the parol evidence rule. Thus, if a contract
appears complete on its face, they would have the parol evidence rule keep out
122. Id. at 95.
123. See supra notes 111-12, 117 and accompanying text.
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evidence of inconsistent or additional terms regardless of whether the parties
actually intended the document to speak finally or completely to their
agreement. In the world of the formalists, an insurer that drafts a clear form
should be entitled to rely on that form in setting rates without worrying that a
court will disregard the finely tuned, clear language. In this world, Judge
Keeton's 1970 article is radical and dangerous. Even if the principles stated
in the article are not new to the contract formalist, they are to be reckoned with,
given the extraordinary articulateness, cogency, and incisiveness with which
Judge Keeton presented his ideas
The other contestants in the battle for the soul of contract law are the
functionalists, who are sometimes also labeled as the progressives, the realists,
or the post-classicists. The champions of this side are Professor Corbin and the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts. The functionalists care less about the text
of contracts, believing it to be most useful as an articulation of the objective
manifestations of the contracting parties and as a means to understanding their
intentions and expectations. They concede that contracting parties normally
intend words in their customary usages, but the more important question to the
functionalist is what the parties intend by the words, and, in situations where
disputes over meaning arise, what the party who utters or uses a word knows
or has reason to know the other party is likely to understand from the party's
expression of the word in the context in which it is used. Text does not have
inherent meaning, but text means what the drafter or speaker knows or should
know the other side will understand those words to mean in context. In
negotiated bargains where misunderstandings arise after the parties agree upon
a common text, this system protects the expectations of the party who has less
knowledge or reason to know what the other side means. Where a form is
standardized, the functionalists substitute objectively reasonable expectations
for whatever the particular recipient of the form understood, given that the
recipient has less reason to know what the drafter means, while the drafter has
insights into what the ordinary, reasonable recipient of the form is likely to
understand. In the functionalists' world, Judge Keeton's doctrine of reasonable
expectations is far from threatening. Indeed, insurance law's doctrine of
reasonable expectations simply restates for insurance lawyers what contract law
is (or should be) saying to all lawyers.
From this perspective, one of the important contributions of Judge Keeton
in his 1970 article was that he took sides in an ongoing battle for the soul of
contract law. His article was descriptive when it told us where insurance law,
as it stood in 1970, was leaning in this battle. His article was normative to the
extent it suggested that insurance law should ally itself with the functionalist
view of contract law. Given that the battle for contract law's future is far from
[Vol. 5:1
INSURANCE, CONTRACT AND THE DOCTRINE
settled, it should not be surprising that courts are presently divided in their
receptivity to Judge Keeton's formulation. And, as Professor Henderson
describes in more detail, 24 the battle between the formalists and functionalists
is particularly intense on the field where proposed revisions of Articles 2, 2A,
and 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code are being considered. This means
that Judge Keeton's article is not just about insurance law; it speaks to
consumers and businesses in any industry where standardized forms are used.
Thus, the debate over reasonable expectations is not just an insurance law
debate. It is a contract law debate, and the prize to the winner is ownership of
a major piece of the soul of contract law.
124. See Henderson supra note 88 at 80-105.
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